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ABSTRACT 
We experimentally compare low-information, high-information 
and self-reporting reputation mechanisms.  The results indicate 
players strategically reacted to the reputation mechanisms, with 
higher information mechanisms increasing market efficiency.   
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1. Reputation and Markets 
Reputations can help ensure promised actions are taken without 
the expense of external enforcement or third party monitoring [6]. 
The Internet and subsequent development of e-commerce allow 
an increasing number of small players to engage in buying and 
selling. However, this environment increases the importance of 
establishing trust in a market where everyone can choose to be 
anonymous. One approach is eBay’s feedback mechanism in 
which participants rate the performance of the other party in their 
transactions.  
Establishing trust is possible through repeated interactions, e.g., 
the tit-for-tat strategy in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma [1].  The 
effects of various reputation mechanisms have been 
experimentally studied in simplified contexts. One approach [5] 
uses the “trust game” among pairs of players, where one player 
can choose to send money to a second, this amount is then 
substantially increased and the second player can choose to share 
some of that gain with the first player. By removing many of the 
complexities involved in market transactions, this game can study 
the effect of different policies of past behaviors revealed to 
participants. For questions involving reputation's effect on market 
efficiency, more complex experimental scenarios are needed. One 
example is a fixed-price market in which sellers have the option 
of not fulfilling their contracts [2]. Players are placed in pairs by 
the experimenter, and randomly assigned roles of buyer or seller. 
The buyer chooses whether to send the purchase price to the seller 
and, if so, the seller then decides whether to deliver the purchase 
or just keep the buyer's money. Revealing the seller's history of 
fulfillment then provides reputation information for the buyer. A 
similar one-sided market, but allowing variable prices, arises in an 
experimental study of a principal/agent market [4]. In this case the  
 
 
agents choose their level of service after principals have 
committed to their contracts. In this experiment, the agents face a 
market choice, maximizing the difference between their fee and 
expense on providing their service, but the payoff for the principal 
is probabilistic rather than directly determined by the choice made 
by the agent. 
In the e-commerce context, although a given person may engage 
in many transactions, only a few may be with a particular person. 
In such cases, people face the question of whether a proposed 
transaction is likely to proceed as agreed. Moreover, unlike the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, people can choose not to do business with 
those deemed untrustworthy, or offer different terms based on the 
perceived level of trust. Furthermore, individuals usually cannot 
spread risk among many transactions, unlike large companies. 
This may lead to risk-averse people avoiding transactions that 
could benefit both parties, and thus result in lower market 
efficiency. Thus an important question is to what extent 
reputation mechanisms can aid this process. Analysis of eBay-like 
markets suggests that while feedback has desirable features in 
theory [3], such a market may not be efficient, fair and stable in 
practice.  
To help address these issues, we designed experiments to provide 
a broader set of endogenous choices for the players than in the 
prior experimental work described above. First, the players can 
explicitly decide who they wish to do business with rather than 
being paired with a single other player by the experimenter. Thus 
we can examine whether people choose to use reputation 
information to ostracize those with low reputations or give them 
poor prices based on their higher perceived risk. Second, both 
buyers and sellers make fulfillment choices and so reputations are 
relevant to both sides of the market. In the context of self-reported 
information, this allows players the opportunity to choose to 
misreport their experience as possible punishment for a poor 
report on their own reputation. More generally, it allows for the 
formation of clusters of mutually high-reputation trading 
arrangements. Third, our experiments include a full market so 
prices and trading volumes are determined endogenously, 
providing a broader view of the macroeconomic consequences of 
different information policies than is possible in more restricted 
scenarios. On the other hand, the additional complexity of a full 
market and players selecting who to do business with makes for a 
more complicated theoretical analysis. 
We choose to study reputation in the laboratory due to the 
uncontrollable nature of real world marketplaces. The key issues 
in designing reputation mechanisms are the nature of information 
to collect, its reliability and how it is disseminated to the 
participants. This paper reports on an experimental comparison of 
mechanisms revealing differing amounts of information on the 
transaction history of the players. We found that subjects Copyright is held by the author/owner(s). 
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responded to amount of information strategically. In addition, we 
observed the endogenously generated consequences for market 
price and volume.   
2. Experimental Design 
Laboratory economic experiments involve small groups 
interacting for only a few hours. Thus experiments with 
reputation mechanisms require a simple underlying market so 
participants can quickly build up enough transaction history to 
distinguish behaviors. Furthermore, the value of a high reputation 
decreases toward the end of an experiment, leading experienced 
subjects to not fulfill contracts. We thus need enough time to see 
at least some behavior relatively unaffected by this end-of-game 
effect.  
The main component of the experiment is an exchange economy 
of a single homogenous good. Each unit of good a buyer 
purchased can be redeemed for a pre-determined amount of 
money. Each unit of good a seller sold costs a pre-determined 
amount of money. In each period, buyers and sellers receive 
tables listing their redemption values and costs, respectively. The 
aggregate supply and demand is kept constant across periods, and 
this is told to participants before each experiment. However, 
redemption values and costs were assigned to random individuals 
in each period.  
We chose a discrete double auction as the market institution. Each 
period consists of a fixed number of rounds. Buyers and sellers 
took turns making offers and accepting offers made by others.  
Players were permitted to have only one offer at a time, although 
they may offer to buy or sell multiple units. In addition, we 
allowed the subjects to filter their offer, i.e., allowing only some 
agents to accept their offer. When an offer was accepted, it 
became a contract – an agreement for the seller to send the goods 
and for the buyer to send payment. The contracts were not 
binding. After the last round of exchanging offers, players were 
given a list of contracts they had accepted. They then decided 
whether or not to fulfill each contract. We included noise, as a 
fixed probability that either payments or goods are lost in transit.  
The information policy determines the past transaction behavior 
made available to participants. We used three information 
policies, announced at the start of each experiment:  
1. Low information:  Players knew only their own 
transactions.   
2. High information:  Players were told about all transactions 
that took place between any buyer and any seller.   
3. Self-reported ratings: After contract fulfillment, players 
could give trading partners a positive or negative rating.  A value-
weighted score of the feedback is then made public. 
Prior to the experiment, participants completed a short training 
program, with self-check quizzes, via the web 
(http://www.hpl.hp.com/econexperiment/MarketInfo/instructions.htm.) 
3. Results 
We conducted 8 experimental sessions. The first had 8 subjects. 
The rest had at least 12 subjects. In all experiments, market prices 
converged reasonably well to equilibrium within 3 periods. While 
rapid convergence is expected for the market [7], this may not 
have been the case with the our addition of non-binding contracts. 
As expected, all experiments exhibit strong end-game effects. 
Subjects were told when the game would end two periods ahead 
of time. Fulfillment decreased sharply around 4 periods before the 
end of an experiment.  
We expect people are more likely to fulfill contracts when more 
information about their actions is available to people deciding 
whether to transact future business with them. This matches our 
observation of lower fulfillment with the low information policy, 
where subjects can safely reason that only people with whom they 
had unfulfilled contracts know of their “bad” record. Thus, not 
fulfilling a contract is less costly to future business than the case 
with full information. This is also strong evidence that people 
react to strategic implications of how information is used by other 
people. The figure shows an example of our experimental results. 
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Fulfillment rates in the self-reporting treatment are similar to the 
high information treatment.  This is consistent with observations 
on Internet auction sites such as eBay where the amount of 
negative feedback is only about 1%. This is not direct evidence 
that cheating is rare since feedback does not have to be 100% 
accurate. Similarly, reports in our experiment were not always 
accurate. However, they were, on average, a good representation 
of how likely a subject is going to fulfill contracts. 
Our experimental design allowed us to also observe endogenous 
macroeconomic effects: when fulfillment decreased, the 
contracted volume also increased but prices remained nearly 
constant. Market efficiencies responded to the level of fulfillment 
in a highly nonlinear fashion.  
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